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CRIMINAL LAW 
THE PROPER REMEDY FOR A LACK OF 
BATSON FINDINGS: 
 THE FALL-OUT FROM SNYDER V. 
LOUISIANA 
WILLIAM H. BURGESS* & DOUGLAS G. SMITH**
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Batson v. Kentucky1 is familiar to most law students and to many fans 
of Law & Order.  The Supreme Court held in Batson that the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to 
exclude potential jurors from a jury on the basis of race.  Racial 
discrimination in jury selection harms the defendant, violates the rights of 
the excluded juror, and harms the public by undermining confidence in the 
criminal justice system.2
 
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP.  J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; 
B.E./B.A. Dartmouth College. 
  If a criminal defendant (or the defendant’s 
attorney) believes that a prosecutor has attempted to use a peremptory 
challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of race, the defendant 
may make a “Batson challenge.”  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Batson 
sets forth a procedure that the trial court must follow in resolving such 
challenges: if the defendant makes a prima facie showing that the 
prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was motivated by race, then the 
prosecutor must offer a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror and 
** Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP; Senior Lecturer in Residence, Loyola University 
Chicago School of Law.  J.D., Northwestern University School of Law; M.B.A., the 
University of Chicago; B.S./B.A., State University of New York at Buffalo.  The views 
expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those 
of Kirkland & Ellis LLP or its clients. 
1 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
2 Id. at 87; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880). 
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the trial court must then decide whether the defendant has shown purposeful 
discrimination.3
The Batson procedure is an attempt to reconcile the tension between 
the constitutional guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause and the 
centuries-old practice of permitting prosecutors and defense attorneys to 
exercise peremptory challenges during jury selection.  More than twenty 
years of experience with that procedure has demonstrated the importance of 
the trial court’s observations during jury selection and contemporaneous 
findings of fact regarding the credibility of the race-neutral explanation that 
a prosecutor offers when challenged on the use of a peremptory challenge.  
Although the trial court’s resolution of a Batson challenge is subject to 
appellate review, appellate courts rely heavily upon the trial court’s findings 
and observations.  Whether a Batson challenge should be sustained 
ultimately turns on whether the prosecutor is credible when he or she 
asserts a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.  In some 
instances, the race-neutral explanation can be confirmed or rejected on the 
basis of the record—for example, when a transcript confirms that a juror 
said something inconsistent with the juror’s duty to weigh the evidence 
impartially, or where a questionnaire confirms that a juror’s background 
may inject bias.  But a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation often turns on 
a juror’s demeanor observed during jury selection, which is not something 
that an appellate court can discern from a cold record.  Moreover, 
peremptory strikes are often the product of instincts of which the prosecutor 
is not fully aware.  Accordingly, courts hold that demeanor-based 
explanations, in particular, should be scrutinized carefully, as they are often 
a convenient way to hide racial prejudice.  Where a prosecutor gives a 
demeanor-based, race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge and 
the trial court allows the challenge without observing the demeanor of the 
challenged juror and without commenting on how it determined that the 
prosecutor was credible, appellate review of the trial court’s ruling is 
practically impossible. 
 
In recent years, state and federal appellate courts have struggled with 
the question of what should happen when (1) the trial court denies a 
defendant’s Batson challenge without making the necessary factual findings 
to permit appellate review and (2) the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation 
for the challenged strike cannot be confirmed or rejected on the basis of the 
record.4
 
3 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98; see also infra Part II.C. 
  The question arises frequently in criminal cases, and one of the 
Supreme Court’s most recent decisions addressing Batson challenges—
4 See infra Part III. 
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Snyder v. Louisiana5
Despite the fact that the Court in Snyder ordered a new trial, the lower 
courts are divided on whether a new trial is always required in similar 
situations, or whether it is instead permissible to remand to the trial court 
for retroactive findings or to conduct an evidentiary hearing to reconstruct 
the prosecutor’s state of mind at the time of jury selection.
—has added to the confusion.  In Snyder, the Supreme 
Court granted review some twelve years after jury selection and ordered a 
new trial where the trial court had failed in its duty to make factual findings 
assessing the credibility of the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for 
questionable peremptory strikes.  As the prosecutor’s explanation was 
based on the juror’s demeanor, it could not be confirmed or rejected on the 
basis of the record. 
6  Decisions 
permitting such remands have invited post hoc justifications for 
questionable peremptory strikes and have sown further confusion as 
litigants dispute the permissible parameters of such proceedings (such as 
whether and to what extent discovery should be permitted, whether defense 
attorneys may question the prosecutor under oath, and whether the 
prosecutor may give new reasons on remand that were not given at trial).7  
Such remands have occasionally taken on lives of their own and wasted 
judicial resources.8
This Article argues that both doctrinal and practical considerations 
counsel in favor of granting the criminal defendant a new trial when the 
trial court fails to make sufficient findings of fact and where the 
prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for the challenged strike cannot be 
confirmed or rejected on the basis of the existing record. 
  Lower courts will continue to struggle with the 
question until the Supreme Court provides a definitive answer. 
Part II explains the doctrinal underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Batson, and the significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Snyder v. Louisiana.  In Batson, the Court articulated a three-part test to 
determine whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.9
 
5 552 U.S. 472 (2008). 
  In Snyder, the Court applied that test in the 
context of a peremptory challenge exercised on the basis of juror demeanor, 
6 Compare McGahee v. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(ordering a new trial), with United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 670 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(remanding for further findings), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 373; see also infra Part III.A–B. 
7 See infra Part IV.B–C. 
8 See infra Part IV.D. 
9 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986); see also infra Part II.C. 
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underscoring that trial courts have a duty to make explicit, on-the-record 
findings in rejecting a Batson challenge.10
Part III discusses the different approaches that state and federal 
appellate courts have taken when the trial court has failed to make the 
findings required by Batson and where the prosecutor’s race-neutral 
explanation cannot be confirmed or denied on the basis of the record.  Some 
courts have held that Snyder requires a new trial in all such cases.
 
11  Other 
courts have ordered a remand, directing the trial court to supply the missing 
findings retroactively if it can, and sometimes permitting the trial court to 
hold an evidentiary hearing for that purpose.12  At least one federal court 
has held, however, that even after Snyder, a lack of explicit findings in 
resolving a Batson challenge is not necessarily reversible error.13
Part IV offers an analysis of the doctrinal and practical considerations 
bearing on the question, concluding that those considerations counsel in 
favor of a bright-line rule directing appellate courts to order a new trial 
whenever a trial court resolves a Batson challenge without making the 
required findings and where the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation 
cannot be confirmed or rejected on the basis of the existing record.  Several 
considerations counsel in favor of such a bright-line rule.  For example, 
such a rule eliminates the possibility that a remand may morph into a series 
of endless proceedings with additional appeals and subsequent remand.  It 
also avoids the temptation to engage in post hoc rationalization of the trial 
court’s prior ruling and avoids the problem that occurs when the lapse of 
time since the trial court’s initial ruling renders subsequent findings 
unreliable.  Finally, it avoids placing on trial judges what is often an 
insurmountable burden—to attempt to reconstruct what happened 
sometimes months or years earlier, often based solely on the judge’s 
recollection.  In light of these inherent problems, a new trial is in many, if 
not most, cases the best solution. 
 
II. BATSON CHALLENGES AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN SNYDER 
V. LOUISIANA 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Batson addresses the conflict 
between the longstanding practice of allowing prosecutors to use 
peremptory challenges during jury selection and the constitutional 
prohibition against excluding people from juries on the basis of race.  The 
 
10 See infra Part II.D. 
11 See infra Part III.A. 
12 See infra Part III.B. 
13 Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also infra Part III.C. 
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Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires that 
peremptory challenges be subject to scrutiny whenever a criminal defendant 
can make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in the 
exercise of the challenge.14  While this might seem like a commonsense 
application of the Equal Protection Clause, particularly in light of the 
fundamental nature of the right to serve on a jury, in practice it has been 
somewhat problematic, largely because of the difficulty of discerning with 
any confidence whether a prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge is 
motivated by race.15  Litigants have repeatedly called upon the Supreme 
Court to clarify how the Batson procedure is to be applied in practice.16
A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
 
Although there is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges, or 
requirement that they be allowed for either the prosecution or the defense,17 
peremptory challenges have been part of jury trials in the United States and 
England for centuries and have been traditionally viewed as a valuable tool 
in the selection of an impartial jury.18
 
14 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–96. 
  Among other things, peremptory 
challenges allow defendants and prosecutors to remove jurors they 
intuitively suspect of bias where the evidence of bias is not sufficient to 
support a challenge for cause.  Peremptory challenges also allow attorneys 
15 See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267–68 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(describing the “awkward, sometime hopeless, task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s 
instinctive judgment—the underlying basis for which may be invisible even to the prosecutor 
exercising the challenge”); Munson v. State, 774 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) 
(citing Batson and a state court case applying it as giving the defendant the “practical burden 
to make a liar out of the prosecutor”); Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of 
Implicit Bias in Jury Selection:  The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed 
Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 162–63 (2010) 
(disussing—and criticizing—the reluctance of trial judges to reject prosecutors’ race-neutral 
explanations). 
16 See infra Parts II.C–D; infra notes 69–82, 145 and accompanying text. 
17 Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2009); United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 
528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). 
18 Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)); 6 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3(d), at 121–22 (3d ed. 2007); see 
also Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis 
and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 510–16 (1997) (comparing the American 
system of voir dire and peremptory challenges with practice in civil law countries and 
discussing the strategic and sometimes abusive use of peremptory challenges); Douglas G. 
Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 
400–02, 434–36, 470–72 (1996) (explaining the history and practice of peremptory 
challenges in England and the United States). 
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to remove jurors they have inadvertently alienated through voir dire 
questioning.19
The use of peremptory challenges has been traced back at least as far 
as the early fourteenth century in England,
 
20 and one of the statutes passed 
by the First Congress in the United States explicitly provided for the use of 
peremptory challenges by criminal defendants charged with crimes against 
the United States.21  Every jurisdiction in the United States currently grants 
peremptory challenges to the defense and the prosecution.22  A 
characteristic feature of peremptory challenges as historically exercised is 
that, unlike a challenge for cause, the party exercising a peremptory 
challenge generally need not explain its reasons to the court or to anyone 
else.  As Blackstone observed, traditionally the peremptory challenge was 
“an arbitrary and capricious” procedure.23
B. STRAUDER, SWAIN, AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
 
The unrestricted nature of peremptory challenges changed in 1965 in 
Swain v. Alabama,24 where the Supreme Court subjected the practice to the 
strictures of the Constitution.  In a long line of cases beginning in 1880 with 
Strauder v. West Virginia,25
 
19 See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353 (“[P]erhaps the bare 
questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment: to prevent all ill 
consequences from which, the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set 
him aside.”). 
 the Supreme Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the government 
20 JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO 
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 147–48 (1977) (citing The Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 
4 (1305)); see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 212–13 (same); 6 LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 
22.3(d), at 122 (same).  Although the 1305 statute, by its terms, took away the prosecution’s 
right to exercise peremptory challenges, the practice under the statute was such that the 
prosecution could still remove potential jurors without explanation, so long as there were a 
sufficient number of jurors remaining at the end of jury selection.  The procedure was 
referred to as “standing aside” because the prosecutor could direct a juror to “stand aside” 
until the end of jury selection.  The prosecutor would only have to explain an objection to 
those jurors if there were not enough jurors remaining.  VAN DYKE, supra, at 148; see also 
United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. 480, 483 (1827) (Story, J.). 
21 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States § 30, 1 Stat. 
112, 119 (1790). 
22 6 LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 22.3(d), at 123. 
23 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *353 (“[I]n criminal trials, or at least in capital ones, 
there is, in favorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of 
challenge to a certain number of jurors, without shewing any cause at all, which is called a 
peremptory challenge.”). 
24 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
25 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
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from purposefully excluding people from juries on account of race.26  In 
Strauder, the Supreme Court invalidated a West Virginia statute that 
forbade African Americans from serving on juries and reversed the 
conviction of an African-American man who was found guilty of murder by 
an all-white jury constituted under that statute.27  Between 1880 and 1965, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed Strauder repeatedly and invalidated several 
other state statutes that excluded African Americans from jury service.28
In Swain, the Supreme Court held that the principle of Strauder—that 
the Equal Protection Clause forbids excluding people from jury service on 
the basis of race—applied to peremptory challenges, but in a very limited 
sense.
 
29  The Court imposed a high burden of proof, however, on criminal 
defendants seeking to show a constitutional violation.  The Court held that 
the presumption must be that the prosecutor has used peremptory 
challenges properly, and that the presumption is not overcome merely by 
showing that the prosecutor has removed all of the potential jurors of a 
certain race from the jury pool.30  Instead, a defendant must show a 
“systematic use” of purposefully race-based peremptory challenges “over a 
period of time.”31  The Court reasoned that a low burden of proof would 
defeat the purpose and operation of peremptory challenges.  If the 
prosecutor’s motives for peremptory challenges could be examined in every 
case in which the defense alleged racial discrimination, without the need to 
show systematic discrimination over time, “[t]he challenge, pro tanto, 
would no longer be peremptory.”32  The defendant did not meet its burden 
in Swain, the Court held, even though the prosecution had used six 
peremptory challenges to remove all of the African-American jurors from 
the jury,33 and the defense had introduced uncontradicted testimony that no 
African-American person had served on a jury in that county since 1950.34
 
26 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 204 n.1 (collecting cases); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 
n.3 (1986) (same). 
  
Three Justices dissented, accusing the majority of undermining the principle 
27 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 312. 
28 Swain, 380 U.S. at 228–29 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citing eighteen cases applying 
Strauder). 
29 Id. at 203–05. 
30 Id. at 226–27. 
31 Id. at 227. 
32 Id. at 222. 
33 There were eight African-American jurors in the pool.  Two were excused, and the 
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove the remaining six.  Id. at 205; VAN DYKE, 
supra note 20, at 151. 
34 Swain, 380 U.S. at 226 (“The fact remains, of course, that there has not been a Negro 
on a jury in Talladega County since about 1950.”); see also VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 57. 
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of Strauder,35 and Swain was subjected to withering criticism in the ensuing 
years as setting an impossibly high burden of proof.36
C. BATSON V. KENTUCKY AND THE MODERN PROCEDURE FOR 
OBJECTING TO THE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
 
In 1986, the Batson Court overruled Swain’s burden of proof for 
showing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in jury selection.37  The 
Court held that a defendant need not show “systematic” use over time of 
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges, but could instead rely 
“solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory 
challenges at the defendant’s trial.”38  So long as a defendant was “a 
member of a cognizable racial group” and the prosecutor has used 
peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors “of the defendant’s 
race” from the jury pool, a defendant could rely solely on circumstantial 
evidence from his own trial to make a prima facie showing of racial 
discrimination.39  Drawing on prior cases applying the Equal Protection 
Clause in jury selection and in other contexts, Batson established a three-
step procedure to adjudicate a defendant’s claim that a prosecutor used a 
peremptory challenge on the basis of race, which courts repeatedly applied 
and refined in the ensuing years.40
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has 
been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, the 
  The Supreme Court recently described 
the procedure as follows: 
 
35 Swain, 380 U.S. at 228–47 (Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C.J, and Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Court today while referring with approval to Strauder and the cases 
which have followed, seriously impairs their authority and creates additional barriers to the 
elimination of jury discrimination practices which have operated in many communities to 
nullify the command of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
36 See, e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120–22 (2d Cir. 1984) (describing the 
Swain burden of proof in a section titled “Mission Impossible” and documenting several 
cases in which there was strong evidence of racial discrimination in the prosecution’s use of 
peremptory challenges, but where defendants failed to meet the Swain burden of proof); 
Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1220 n.17 (11th Cir. 1983) (collecting academic commentary 
critical of Swain).  But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 n.14 (1986) (noting that 
some commentators had urged the Supreme Court to adhere to Swain and citing as an 
example of such commentary Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptory 
Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 
337 (1982)). 
37 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92–93; see also id. at 100 (White, J., concurring) (“The Court 
overturns the principal holding in Swain v. Alabama.”). 
38 Id. at 94, 96. 
39 Id. at 96. 
40 Id. at 93–98.  
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prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, 
in light of parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant 
has shown purposeful discrimination.41
Accordingly, once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation 
for the exercise of a peremptory challenge, the trial court has “‘the duty to 
determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.’”
 
42  In 
doing so, the court must conduct an “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of 
mind based on demeanor and credibility.”43
“[T]he trial court’s first-hand observations [are] of even greater 
importance” where “race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges . . . 
invoke a juror’s demeanor.”
 
44  There, “the trial court must evaluate not only 
whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also 
whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the 
basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.”45  Accordingly, 
an “explicit, on-the-record analysis” is required.46
Under Batson, the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation for the 
challenge must be “clear and reasonably specific” and contain “legitimate 
reasons.”
 
47  While “[a]n impression of the conduct and demeanor of a 
prospective juror during the voir dire may provide a legitimate basis for the 
exercise of a peremptory challenge,” the “prosecutor’s explanations in the 
face of a Batson inquiry” must be “sufficiently specific to provide a basis 
upon which to evaluate their legitimacy.”48  “[B]ecause such after-the-fact 
rationalizations are susceptible to abuse, a prosecutor’s reason for discharge 
bottomed on demeanor evidence deserves particularly careful scrutiny.”49
The Batson procedure is “designed to produce actual answers to 
suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury 
 
 
41 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476–77 (2008) (citations and alterations omitted). 
42 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98). 
43 Id. at 365. 
44 Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477. 
45 Id. 
46 McCurdy v. Montgomery Cnty., 240 F.3d 512, 521–22 (6th Cir. 2001).  The court 
explained that “an explicit, on-the-record analysis . . . is especially important when the 
purported race-neutral justification is predicated on subjective explanations like body 
language or demeanor”; the district court ruling in which it “perfunctorily accepted the 
County’s race-neutral explanation” did not comply with the “requirement that the district 
court make expressed findings on each of the elements of a Batson claim” and was only 
corrected when “the district court made its own findings pertaining to [juror’s] demeanor.”  
Id. 
47 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.  
248, 258 (1981)). 
48 Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1992). 
49 Id. 
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selection process,”50 and seeks to accommodate the inherent tension arising 
out of the coexistence of peremptory challenges and the constitutional 
guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause.51  When the Supreme Court 
decided Batson, Justice Marshall feared that it did not go far enough and 
would have abolished peremptory strikes altogether.  He noted the 
difficulties of assessing the motives of prosecutors, particularly where a 
strike may be the product of unconscious bias, and particularly where 
demeanor-based explanations for peremptory strikes could easily be used to 
hide racial bias.52  The Batson majority defended its procedure, in part, by 
asserting its faith in the diligence and alertness of trial judges during jury 
selection: “Certainly, this Court may assume that trial judges, in supervising 
voir dire in light of our decision today, will be alert to identify a prima facie 
case of purposeful discrimination.”53
D. SNYDER V. LOUISIANA 
 
 
50 Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005). 
51 In Batson, Justice Marshall stated that the tension between peremptory challenges and 
the Equal Protection Clause is unresolvable, and called for the abolition of peremptory 
challenges by prosecutors.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 105–07 (Marshall, J., concurring); cf. Swain 
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer has echoed 
Justice Marshall’s concerns, arguing that subsequent experience has underscored the conflict 
between peremptory challenges and the Equal Protection Clause.  Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 
333, 344 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266–73 (2005) 
(Breyer, J., concurring).  However, Justice Breyer has stopped short of an explicit call for the 
abolition of peremptory challenges, noting that “legal life without peremptories is no longer 
unthinkable,” Rice, 546 U.S. at 344 (Breyer, J., concurring); Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 272 
(same) (Breyer, J., concurring), and calling for the Court to “reconsider Batson’s test and the 
peremptory challenge system as a whole.”  Rice, 546 U.S. at 344 (Breyer, J., concurring); 
Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 273 (same) (Breyer, J., concurring).  Judge Bennett of the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Iowa reads Justice Breyer’s concurring opinions as a call 
for the abolition of peremptory challenges, and calls for the same result.  Bennett, supra note 
15, at 167. 
52 Batson, 476 U.S. at 105–06 (Marshall, J., concurring).  In the years following Batson, 
its holding has been extended to other forms of discrimination in the use of peremptory 
challenges.  See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (2000) (holding that a criminal 
defendant’s use of race-based peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause); 
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (holding that prosecutor’s use of gender-
based peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause); Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (permitting a private party in a civil case to use 
peremptory challenges on the basis of race is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, 
though framed as “the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) (finding that Batson’s holding applies 
regardless of whether defendant and excluded juror are of the same race). 
53 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22 (majority opinion). 
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In Snyder v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court issued significant guidance 
regarding the Batson procedure.  In Snyder, an African-American man was 
convicted of murder after a jury trial.  Although jury selection occurred in 
1996,54 the case did not reach the Supreme Court until 2007.55  The Court 
reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial where the trial court failed 
to make adequate findings in the course of rejecting a Batson challenge.56
The facts and circumstances in Snyder were particularly compelling.  
The prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse an African-
American prospective juror and offered two race-neutral explanations when 
challenged, one of which was that the prospective juror “looked very 
nervous.”
  
In so ruling, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Batson procedure 
relies heavily on the firsthand observations of the trial court judge. 
57  Defense counsel disputed those explanations, but the trial court 
allowed the peremptory challenge without comment.58
The Court reaffirmed that “the Constitution forbids striking even a 
single juror for a discriminatory purpose,”
  Accordingly, there 
was no basis in the record to determine precisely why the trial court rejected 
the Batson challenge. 
59 and proceeded to examine the 
record regarding the prosecutor’s explanations.  The Court found that the 
prosecution’s first explanation—that the prospective juror had a work 
obligation that would conflict with jury service—could be evaluated on the 
basis of the record, which showed that the explanation was “suspicious” 
and “implausib[le].”60  Regarding the explanation that the juror looked 
nervous, the Court noted that there was no record of the prospective juror’s 
demeanor, and “nervousness cannot be shown from a cold transcript.”61  In 
the absence of express findings regarding the nervousness explanation, the 
Court could not “presume that the trial judge credited the prosecutor’s 
assertion that [the juror] was nervous.”62
The ultimate resolution in Snyder is the main source of confusion in 
the lower courts—in Snyder, the Court vacated the defendant’s conviction 
 
 
54 552 U.S. at 475. 
55 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 473 (2007), available at 
2007 WL 1812490. 
56 Synder, 552 U.S. at 485–86. 
57 Id. at 478. 
58 Id. at 479. 
59 Id. at 478. 
60 Id. at 483.  The record reflected that service as a juror would not substantially interfere 
with the prospective juror’s work obligations and that the prosecutor “accept[ed] white jurors 
who disclosed conflicting obligations that appear[ed] to have been at least as serious.”  Id. 
61 Id. at 479 (quoting Louisiana Supreme Court). 
62 Id. 
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and remanded for a new trial.  In Batson, after announcing its new 
procedure, the Supreme Court noted that the trial court did not require the 
prosecutor to explain his peremptory challenge, and the Court thus 
remanded for further proceedings.63  The Court’s order did not vacate the 
conviction, but instead instructed the lower courts to revisit the peremptory 
challenge: “[i]f the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, 
purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a 
neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require that petitioner’s 
conviction be reversed.”64  In Snyder, however, the Court rejected the 
possibility of remanding for further findings, noting that the record did not 
show “that the prosecution would have pre-emptively challenged [the juror] 
based on his nervousness alone.  Nor [was] there any realistic possibility 
that this subtle question of causation could be profitably explored further on 
remand at this late date, more than a decade after petitioners’ trial.”65  
Accordingly, the Court set aside the defendant’s conviction and sentence, 
and remanded for “further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”66  
The Louisiana Supreme Court understood the Court’s instructions to require 
a new trial.67
The Court was not explicit in Snyder about whether and to what extent 
its decision to order a new trial instead of a remand rested on (1) the lapse 
of more than ten years between jury selection in the trial court and the 
Court’s decision—as opposed to the two years that had passed in Batson—
or (2) the trial court’s failure to make any factual findings in disposing of 
the defendant’s Batson objection.  It is perhaps for that reason that Snyder 
has helped to deepen and crystallize a preexisting split of authority in the 
lower courts, as different courts have drawn different lessons from Snyder 
and reached different conclusions regarding the remedy required for a trial 
court’s failure to make the findings required by Batson.  Depending on how 
one reads Snyder, there are four apparent possible consequences of a trial 
court’s failure to make the required findings in cases where the appellate 
court cannot confirm or reject the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation on 
the basis of the record: (1) Snyder requires a new trial in all such cases, (2) 
Snyder requires a new trial only in cases of extreme delay between the 
 
 
63 Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986). 
64 Id. 
65 Snyder, 552 U.S. at 485–86. 
66 Id. at 486. 
67 State v. Snyder, 982 So. 2d 763 (La. 2008) (characterizing the Court’s holding as 
“effectively set[ting] aside defendant’s conviction and sentence”); see also Paul Purpura, 
Kenner Man Indicted Again in 1995 Killing: Supreme Court Tossed Earlier Conviction, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 30, 2009, at B3 (noting the pendency of the new trial).   
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initial jury selection and the remand, (3) Snyder permits appellate courts to 
order remands for further findings, or (4) Snyder permits appellate courts to 
presume that the trial court’s ruling was correct. 
III. THE CONFLICT AMONG THE LOWER COURTS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder has generated a great deal of 
uncertainty regarding the proper relief in a case where the trial court failed 
to make the required Batson findings.  Some courts have read Snyder as 
requiring a new trial in all such cases.  Other courts have continued to order 
a remand to the trial court to make the required findings, in some instances 
ordering that the court undertake an evidentiary hearing.  Finally, at least 
one court—the Eighth Circuit—has held that the failure to make Batson 
findings is not necessarily error at all.68
A. COURTS ORDERING NEW TRIALS 
 
Where a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for a strike cannot be 
confirmed or rejected on the basis of the trial record, and where the trial 
court failed to make the required findings in the course of resolving a 
Batson objection to a peremptory strike, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
have ordered new trials, as have several state appellate courts and federal 
district courts ruling on habeas petitions.  Those courts have done so in 
large measure in reliance upon Snyder, reading the Court’s decision 
granting a new trial as imposing a broad and general command regarding 
the proper relief when there is an absence of Batson findings. 
In Haynes v. Quarterman,69 the Fifth Circuit ordered a new trial.  At 
the defendant’s original trial, two different judges presided over different 
parts of jury selection.  One judge presided at the beginning when the jurors 
were addressed as a group and again at the end when the parties exercised 
peremptory challenges and when the defendant made the Batson challenge.  
The other trial judge presided over a middle stage in which the attorneys 
questioned prospective jurors individually.70
 
68 See Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“In fact, federal law 
has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge, especially where a 
prima facie case is acknowledged and the prosecution presents specific nondiscriminatory 
reasons on the record.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1905 (2009) (habeas case); United States v. 
Grant, 563 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying Smulls on direct review of a criminal 
conviction), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1504 (2009); see also infra Part III.C. (discussing Smulls 
and Grant). 
  During the Batson hearing, 
69 561 F.3d 535, 540–41 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 
1171 (2010). 
70 Id. at 537. 
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the prosecutor explained his decision to use peremptory challenges to 
excuse two prospective jurors solely on the basis of their demeanor in 
responding to questions during the middle stage of jury selection.71  The 
judge who ruled on the defendant’s Batson challenge—who had not 
observed the demeanor of those witnesses, as he did not preside over the 
middle stage—nonetheless allowed the peremptory challenge.  The Fifth 
Circuit, on habeas review, held that the judge’s decision to deny the Batson 
challenge, even though he had not observed the basis of the prosecutor’s 
explanation, was error and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial or 
to release from custody.72
In ordering a new trial, the Fifth Circuit relied in part on the Supreme 
Court’s guidance in Snyder regarding the critical role of the trial court in 
resolving Batson objections, particularly those involving demeanor-based 
explanations from the prosecutor.
 
73  “For demeanor-based explanations 
especially,” the court noted, “appellate review is necessarily dependent on 
the trial court’s inquiry into the prosecutor’s reasons and his personal 
observations of the juror’s demeanor that is the basis for those reasons.”74  
Because the trial judge who ruled on the defendant’s Batson challenge 
assessed the plausibility of the prosecutor’s demeanor-based explanation on 
the basis of the “cold record,” the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court erred 
and therefore ordered that the defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus be granted.75
The Supreme Court summarily reversed the Fifth Circuit, without 
addressing the appropriate relief under such circumstances.
 
76  The Court 
clarified that, despite the importance of the trial court’s firsthand 
observations during jury selection, neither Batson nor Snyder established a 
per se rule that a demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the trial 
judge did not observe or could not recall the juror’s demeanor.77  While the 
trial court’s firsthand observations of jurors can be important, the Court 
noted that the ultimate inquiry concerns the intentions of the prosecutor, 
and “the best evidence of the attorney exercising a strike is often that 
attorney’s demeanor.”78
 
71 Id. at 537–38. 
  The Court understood the Fifth Circuit to have 
granted the writ of habeas corpus by applying a categorical rule that a 
72 Id. at 540–41. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 540. 
75 Id. at 541. 
76 Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171 (2010). 
77 Id. at 1174. 
78 Id. at 1175. 
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prosecutor’s demeanor-based explanation for a peremptory strike must be 
rejected if the trial judge did not personally observe or could not recall the 
juror’s demeanor.79  Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded.80  The 
Court left open the question of “whether the [trial court’s] determination 
may be overcome under the federal habeas statute’s standard for reviewing 
a state court’s resolution of questions of fact.”81
In McGahee v. Department of Corrections,
 
82 the Eleventh Circuit 
ordered a new trial where the trial judge failed to make any of the findings 
required by Batson and resolved the defendant’s Batson objection without 
comment, saying only, “Your motion is denied.”83  After trial, the trial court 
asked the prosecution for more specific reasons for its use of peremptory 
strikes, but again failed to make a specific ruling on the adequacy or 
credibility of those reasons.84  The failure to make any factual findings on 
the defendant’s Batson objection, the Eleventh Circuit held, was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, entitling the 
defendant to a new trial.85  As the Fifth Circuit did in Haynes, the Eleventh 
Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Snyder.86
State courts in Louisiana and Colorado have ordered new trials based 
on similar reasoning.  In State v. Jacobs,
 
87 the Louisiana Court of Appeal 
ordered a new trial where the trial judge resolved the defendant’s Batson 
objections without comment, saying only, “The Court is going to deny the 
defense’s motion.”88  Throughout its opinion, the court of appeal relied 
upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder, holding that each instance in 
which the trial judge denied the defendant’s Batson objection without 







82 560 F.3d 1252, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2009). 
83 Id. at 1259. 
84 Id. at 1259–60. 
85 Id. at 1259–61. 
86 Id. at 1260, 1268, 1269. 
87 13 So. 3d 677 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
88 Id. at 692. 
89 See, e.g., id. (“Yet again, the trial judge failed to specifically address the plausibility of 
any of the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral explanations, based on the prosecutor’s 
credibility and the prospective juror’s demeanor.  This failure constituted reversible error.”); 
id. at 693 (“These strikes . . . illustrate the need for the trial judge to perform his pivotal role 
in evaluating the claims as required by Snyder.”). 
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In People v. Collins,90 the Colorado Court of Appeals ordered a new 
trial where the trial court focused more clearly on the defendant’s Batson 
objection but ultimately overruled it without making any findings crediting 
the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral explanations.91  The prosecutor gave 
five race-neutral explanations for the peremptory strike at issue, two of 
which concerned the juror’s demeanor.  When the trial court initially 
indicated an inclination to sustain the Batson objection, the prosecutor 
stated that, as evidence of his lack of racial bias, he had no objection to the 
other African-American prospective juror serving on the panel.92  The trial 
court ultimately overruled the Batson objection, discussing the individual 
steps of the Batson procedure and ultimately concluding: “I’m going to 
find, by preponderance of the evidence, that the decision to exclude [the 
juror] was not motivated by racial—or because of her race.  Again, I’m 
considering the totality of the circumstances, which I think were not present 
at the initial challenge.”93
The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.  The court noted 
that the fact that the prosecutor struck one, rather than two, African-
American jurors was “relevant” but “not dispositive.”
 
94  Regarding the five 
race-neutral reasons the prosecutor gave for the strike, the court held that 
“three of the race-neutral reasons . . . are affirmatively refuted by the 
record, and the district court did not specifically credit the others.”95  The 
two reasons that the trial court did not specifically credit were based on the 
prospective juror’s demeanor and could not be confirmed or rejected on the 
basis of the record: the juror allegedly had her arms crossed and slept 
during part of voir dire.96  Citing and discussing Snyder, the court of 
appeals refused to presume that the trial court credited the prosecutor’s 
statements about the juror sleeping and crossing her arms where the trial 
court did not specifically credit those explanations and where there was 
some reason to believe that the trial court in fact did not credit those 
statements.  Accordingly, the court of appeals held that given its lack of 
specific factual findings, the trial court “clearly erred in overruling the 
defendant’s Batson objection.”97
 
90 187 P.3d 1178 (Colo. App. 2008). 
  Unlike the cases in which trial courts have 
overruled Batson objections without comment, in Collins there was greater 
91 Id. at 1183–84. 
92 Id. at 1180–81. 
93 Id. at 1181. 
94 Id. at 1183–84. 
95 Id. at 1183. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1184. 
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reason to suspect that the trial court paid attention to the prosecutor and the 
jury pool during jury selection and might have been able to recall the events 
in sufficient detail to make reliable findings if the court of appeals ordered a 
remand.  Nonetheless, the court of appeals held that the trial court’s clear 
error required reversal of the defendant’s convictions.98
Indeed, several other state and federal courts have ordered new trials 
when confronted with a situation in which the trial judge has failed to make 
the required findings and overruled a defendant’s Batson objection with 
little or no comment.
 
99  Many of these decisions predate the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Snyder.100
B. COURTS REMANDING FOR FURTHER FINDINGS 
  These courts have held that a new trial is a 
natural extension of the Batson framework and is the appropriate remedy 
where a trial court fails to make required findings. 
In contrast, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits (the last in an 
unpublished opinion),101
Many of these courts seem to read the relief ordered in Snyder as 
resting solely on the fact that more than ten years had passed since jury 
selection.  They place great weight on the Supreme Court’s statement that 
there was not “any realistic possibility that this subtle question of causation 
[the motivation for the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge] could be 
profitably explored further on remand at this late date, more than a decade 
 as well as several lower courts, have remanded to 
the trial court to allow it to make retroactive factual findings or to hold 
evidentiary hearings to reconstruct the prosecutor’s state of mind at the time 
of jury selection.  Where the trial court has failed to make the required 




99 See, e.g., Conway v. Dexter, No. 00-CV-7350, 2008 WL 4814260, at *13 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 31, 2008) (ordering a new trial on habeas review where “neither the trial court nor the 
court of appeal made any serious effort to conduct the thorough inquiry required by 
Batson”); State v. Cheatteam, 986 So. 2d 738, 753 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (relying on Snyder in 
ordering a new trial where the prosecutor struck a juror because she was rolling her eyes, but 
the trial court did not, through explicit findings, “verify the aspect of the juror’s demeanor 
upon which the prosecutor based his or her peremptory challenge”); cf. People v. Gonzales, 
81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing for a new trial after Snyder where 
“[t]he trial court . . . did not sufficiently question and evaluate the prosecutor’s exercise of 
his peremptory challenges”). 
100 Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024, 1039 (Fla. 1991); Bernard v. State, 659 So. 2d 
1346, 1348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Jackson v Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 1, 6 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1989). 
101 Love v. Scribner, 278 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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after petitioner’s trial.”102  Other courts have reached the same result 
without directly addressing the appropriateness of that remedy.103
United States v. McMath
 
104 is one of the clearer examples of how some 
courts have read Snyder as having ordered a new trial instead of a remand 
because of the passage of time.  In McMath, the trial court resolved the 
defendant’s Batson challenge without making any factual findings.  During 
jury selection, the Government used one of its peremptory challenges to 
excuse one of the two African-American jurors on the panel.105  Defense 
counsel raised a Batson challenge, and the prosecutor responded that her 
reason for striking the prospective juror was the “expression on his face”: 
“He looked angry and not happy to be here.”  Defense counsel disputed that 
explanation, and the district court denied the Batson challenge without 
making any findings, simply stating “[t]he Batson challenge is denied.”106  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court “clearly erred in 
denying the Batson challenge without making findings regarding the 
credibility of the proffered race-neutral justification for the strike.”107  As 
the court put it, “the district court [1] did not indicate whether it agreed that 
Juror 7 had an unhappy expression on his face, [2] did not indicate whether 
this expression was unique to Juror 7 or common to other jurors, and [3] 
made no evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility.”108  Accordingly, the 
court could not “presume that the prosecutor’s race-neutral justification was 
credible simply because the district judge ultimately denied the 
challenge.”109  Although the defendant argued that he was entitled to a new 
trial under the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder, the Seventh Circuit 
disagreed and instead ordered a remand “for further findings and a possible 
evidentiary hearing on the Batson issue.”110
 
102 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 486 (2008). 
  The Seventh Circuit explained 
that it viewed Snyder as ordering a new trial instead of a remand because of 
the passage of time: 
103 See, e.g., Love, 278 F. App’x at 718 (remanding for an evidentiary hearing after 
Snyder where the trial court prevented the defendant from “elicit[ing] the facts that would 
have allowed the trial court [and appellate courts] to evaluate the alleged similarities” 
between jurors who were struck and jurors who were not struck). 
104 559 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 373 (2009).  The authors 
represented Mr. McMath in his appeal and other proceedings following his initial trial and 
sentencing. 
105 Id. at 661. 
106 Id. 
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In Snyder, remand for the trial judge to make findings regarding the juror’s demeanor 
was deemed fruitless because the trial had occurred more than ten years prior.  But 
remand may be more worthwhile in this case, as voir dire occurred only a little over a 
year ago.  While it is certainly possible that the passage of time will make it 
impossible for the district judge to make findings of fact, our concern for judicial 
economy persuades us that allowing the district judge the opportunity for such 
findings is the correct course.  Upon remand, if the passage of time precludes the 
district court from making factual findings, it must vacate the judgment of 
conviction.111
If, however, the district court found that it could make the required findings 
on remand, the Seventh Circuit directed it to do so and then either move on 
to sentencing or order a new trial.
 
112
In Dolphy v. Mantello,
 
113 the Second Circuit ordered a remand under 
similar circumstances.  There, the prosecution exercised a peremptory strike 
to remove an African-American prospective juror.  When challenged, the 
prosecutor stated that he struck the juror because she was overweight and 
because, in the prosecutor’s experience, “heavy-set people tend to be very 
sympathetic toward any defendant.”114  The trial court overruled the 
defendant’s Batson objection, stating only that “I’m satisfied that is a race 
neutral explanation . . . .”115  On habeas review, the Second Circuit could 
not “say that the trial court properly applied Batson.”116  “Because the trial 
court failed to assess the credibility of the prosecution’s explanation,” the 
court held, “it follows that there was no adjudication of [the defendant’s] 
Batson claim on the merits.”117  The court therefore remanded to the district 
court, stating that it “may, in its discretion, hold a hearing to reconstruct the 
prosecutor’s state of mind at the time of jury selection . . . or, if the passage 
of time has made such a determination impossible or unsatisfactory, the 
district court may grant the writ [of habeas corpus] contingent on the state 
granting [the defendant] a new trial.”118
Other lower federal and state courts have joined the Second, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits in ordering remands instead of new trials.  As noted, 
 
 
111 Id. (citation omitted). 
112 Id. at 670.  In United States v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839, 844–45 (7th Cir. 2007), appeal 
after remand, 277 F. App’x 610, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit likewise 
ordered a limited remand, directing the trial court to supply missing findings of fact.  That 
case is discussed in greater detail in Part IV.D, infra. 
113 552 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2009). 
114 Id. at 237. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 239. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 240. 
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some of those opinions appear to order remands based on the belief that the 
Supreme Court ordered a new trial in Snyder based solely on the fact that 
more than ten years had passed since jury selection.119  Other decisions, 
however, call for remand proceedings—or evidentiary hearings, in the case 
of federal courts exercising habeas review—several years after jury 
selection without any apparent consideration of the choice of remedy the 
Supreme Court made in Snyder.120
C. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S NARROW INTERPRETATION OF SNYDER 
 
Further demonstrating the degree of doctrinal confusion in the lower 
courts after Snyder is the fact that the Eighth Circuit does not read Snyder 
as requiring explicit findings by the trial court at all.121  The Eighth Circuit 
apparently stands alone in this regard.  In contrast to Snyder, where the 
Supreme Court refused to presume that the trial court credited the 
prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral explanation absent specific findings, the 
majority in Smulls apparently took the opposite view, explaining that “[a] 
trial court’s ruling on a Batson challenge is itself a factual determination, 
and we have repeatedly upheld rulings made without additional 
reasoning.”122
The Smulls majority distinguished Snyder, noting that “a number of 
factors” supported the Supreme Court’s refusal to presume that the trial 
court credited the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reason for exercising a 
peremptory challenge.
 
123  The majority focused on the fact that in Snyder 
the prosecutor gave two reasons, one of which was belied by the record and 
the other of which was demeanor-based.124
 
119 See, e.g., Kassem v. State, 263 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (remanding for 
the intermediate appellate court “to conduct a full Batson hearing and to enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or to make a determination that such a hearing would not be 
practicable, in which case the [court] should remand for a new trial”). 
  In Smulls, by contrast, neither 
of the prosecutor’s nondiscriminatory reasons was as suspect as the 
120 See, e.g., Patterson v. Alameida, No. 02-CV-2321, 2008 WL 2326295, at *15 (E.D. 
Cal. June 3, 2008) (ordering an evidentiary hearing eight years after jury selection); People 
v. Davis, 899 N.E.2d 238, 249-50 (Ill. 2008) (ordering a remand four years after jury 
selection); United States v. Taylor, 277 F. App’x 610, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2008). 
121 See Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“In fact, federal 
law has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge, especially where 
a prima facie case is acknowledged and the prosecution presents specific nondiscriminatory 
reasons on the record.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1905 (2009) (habeas case); United States v. 
Grant, 563 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying Smulls on direct review of a criminal 
conviction), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1504 (2009). 
122 Smulls, 535 F.3d at 860. 
123 Id. at 860–61. 
124 Id. 
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prosecutor’s reason in Snyder, and thus the court held, “the trial court’s 
failure to make explicit findings [did not] relieve [the appellate] court of its 
obligation to view the state trial court’s findings as presumptively 
correct.”125
Although there is some language in Smulls suggesting that its holding 
was based on the AEDPA standard of review,
 
126 the Eighth Circuit 
subsequently applied Smulls on direct review in United States v. Grant.127  
In Grant, the court of appeals examined a case in which the defendant 
argued on appeal that the district court did not make detailed findings at 
step three of the Batson procedure.  In rejecting the defendant’s arguments, 
the majority in Grant cited Smulls repeatedly for the proposition that trial 
courts are not required to make findings of fact in the course of ruling on a 
Batson challenge.128  Both Smulls and Grant drew spirited dissents.129
 
125 Id. at 861. 
 
126 See id. (“In any event, Snyder was not clearly established law at the time of the state 
courts’ rejection of Smulls’ Batson claim . . . .”).  Under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214, a federal court may not 
grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 
state court unless the state court’s adjudication was either “an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence” presented in state court or “contrary to, or . . . an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). 
127 563 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1504 (2010). 
128 See id. at 389 (“A trial court’s ruling on a Batson challenge is itself a factual 
determination.  [F]ederal law has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson 
challenge, especially where a prima facie case is acknowledged and the [non-moving party] 
presents specific nondiscriminatory reasons on the record.”) (quoting Smulls, 535 F.3d at 
860 (original alterations)); id. at 390 n.3 (quoting the same language from Smulls); id. at 391 
n.5 (“The district court’s analysis did not have to address, or make specific factfindings on, 
all of Grant’s counsel’s reasons for striking Juror Ham.”); id. at 392 n.6 (“The district court 
was not required to make specific factfindings, or provide explanation, on each reason 
offered by Grant’s counsel.”). 
129 Smulls, 535 F.3d at 868–74 (Bye, J., dissenting); Grant, 563 F.3d at 394–99 (Bye, J., 
dissenting).  In Smulls, in particular, Judge Bye described the inconsistency between the 
majority’s opinion and Snyder and rebutted the grounds on which the majority sought to 
distinguish Snyder.  Smulls, 535 F.3d at 870–73 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
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Although the split predates Snyder,130 most of the pre-Snyder cases 
appear to hold that a trial court may order a limited remand most of the 
time, as the Supreme Court did in Batson.  Several cases have recognized, 
however, that it is often unrealistic to expect anything useful to result from 
those remands in light of the passage of time, the nature of the Batson 
inquiry, and the fallibility of human memory.131
By ordering a new trial instead of a remand, and by emphasizing the 
importance of contemporaneous observations and factfinding by trial courts 
during jury selection, Snyder has brought the remedy question into sharp 
focus and further deepened the confusion among the lower courts.  There is 
now a mature split of authority that includes both the federal and state 
courts and is in need of clarification. 
 
IV. THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY AFTER SNYDER 
The practice of allowing remands for further findings on a defendant’s 
Batson challenge has often proven to be unworkable and has caused 
significant inefficiency in the lower courts.  There are many practical and 
theoretical problems associated with this practice, which at times has taken 
 
130 Compare, e.g., Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024, 1029 (Fla. 1991) (reversing 
conviction on the ground that “[p]eremptory challenges based on bare looks and gestures are 
not acceptable reasons unless observed by the trial judge and confirmed by the judge on the 
record”), Bernard v. State, 659 So. 2d 1346, 1348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (stating, in 
ordering a new trial, that “[p]eremptory challenges based on bare looks and gestures are not 
acceptable reasons unless observed by the trial court and confirmed by the judge on the 
record.  In this case, the trial court did not confirm the facial expressions, and the record, 
therefore, does not support the reason the state gave for its challenge.”) (citation omitted), 
Davis v. State, 796 S.W.2d 813, 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (ordering a new trial where the 
prosecutor “fail[ed] to explain why he considered [the juror’s] appearance and reaction 
during voir dire to be adverse”), Jackson v. Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 1, 5–6 (Va. Ct. App. 
1989) (ordering new trial where “[t]he trial judge made no factual findings,” and observing 
that under Batson “[t]he trial judge cannot merely accept at face value the reasons proffered 
but must independently evaluate those reasons as he would any disputed fact” and thus “[t]he 
record must contain findings by the trial judge, not just a conclusion, in order to facilitate 
both the initial inquiry and appellate review”), and Hill v. State, 547 So. 2d 175, 176–77 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (granting new trial where no evidence of juror yawning existed 
other than prosecutor’s representation), with United States v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 
2007) (remand for further findings), and People v. Johnson, 136 P.3d 804, 808 (Cal. 2006)  
(same). 
131 See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (stating 
that it would be “unrealistic” “[i]n many—perhaps most—cases” to expect that the 
prosecutor and trial will be able to recall the circumstances of jury selection in any useful 
way and that “[w]hile we have every confidence in the good faith and professionalism of the 
parties, we have less confidence in their memories”). 
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on a life of its own, leading to successive appeals and additional 
proceedings. 
A. THE IMPOSSIBLE BURDEN ON TRIAL COURT JUDGES 
At the third step of the Batson procedure, the trial judge must assess 
the plausibility of the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation “in light of all 
evidence with a bearing on it.”132  The Batson majority described this as a 
“sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available.”133
The Court recognized in Snyder that, where more than a decade had 
passed between jury selection and the Court’s decision, there was no 
“realistic possibility that this subtle question of causation could be 
profitably explored further on remand at this late date.”
  When an appellate court orders a remand for 
retroactive findings on a Batson challenge, the trial judge may be asked to 
recall—often years after jury selection—such things as a challenged juror’s 
facial expression, whether a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for 
challenging an African-American juror applied equally to non-challenged 
white jurors, and the prosecutor’s demeanor at the time of the peremptory 
challenge. 
134  Given the typical 
timing of the appellate review process and the sensitivity of the inquiry, the 
Court’s observation in Snyder is also applicable to the run-of-the mill 
appeal that moves more quickly.135  More often than not, it is unreasonable 
to expect trial judges to recall such subtle details months, if not years, after 
the fact.  Other courts have recognized this as well, at least in cases 
involving delays of several years between the Batson challenge and the 
remand.136
 
132 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 251 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 
133 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1985). 
134 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 486 (2008). 
135 See also Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 370 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Years after trial, the 
prosecutor cannot adequately reconstruct his reasons for striking a venireman.  Nor can the 
judge recall whether he believed a potential juror’s statement that any alleged biases would 
not prevent him from being a fair and impartial juror.  Furthermore, any prosecutorial 
misconduct is easily remedied before trial simply by seating the wrongfully struck 
venireman.  After trial, the only remedy is setting aside the conviction.” (footnote omitted)). 
136 See, e.g., People v. Snow, 746 P.2d 452, 458 (Cal. 1987) (In a case involving a six-
year delay, court stated: “we believe it would be ‘unrealistic to believe that the prosecutor 
could now recall in greater detail his reasons for the exercise of the peremptory challenges in 
issue, or that the trial judge could assess those reasons, as required, which would demand 
that he recall the circumstances of the case, and the manner in which the prosecutor 
examined the venire and exercised his other challenges.’”) (quoting People v. Hall, 672 P.2d 
854, 860 (Cal. 1983), a case involving a three-year delay). 
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B. AN INVITATION FOR POST HOC JUSTIFICATIONS 
In addition to the unreasonableness of asking trial courts to make 
retroactive findings on Batson challenges, such requests invite post hoc 
justifications on remand from prosecutors for making peremptory 
challenges and from trial judges in allowing them.  This is both a basic 
aspect of human nature and a phenomenon that numerous courts have 
recognized.137
As several Justices of the Supreme Court have acknowledged, 
peremptory challenges are often the product of “seat-of-the pants instincts” 
that defy articulation and that are based on reasons of which the prosecutor 
may not be fully aware.
 
138  As Justice Breyer put it in a concurring opinion 
in Miller-El v. Dretke, “at step three, Batson asks judges to engage in the 
awkward, sometime hopeless, task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s 
instinctive judgment—the underlying basis for which may be invisible even 
to the prosecutor exercising the challenge.”139  Justice Breyer also noted 
that the psychological literature confirms the subconscious nature of the 
sort of bias that the Batson procedure attempts to uncover.140
However, if the task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s instinctive 
judgment is “awkward” and sometimes “hopeless” just before trial, it is 
even more so during a remand proceeding that typically occurs more than a 
year later.  As judges who were likely not paying sufficient attention during 
the first proceeding try to remember their perceptions of jury selection from 
more than a year earlier, and as prosecutors try to remember the reasons 
they challenged a juror in the first proceeding, the results are unlikely to be 
  Uncovering 
such unconscious bias is difficult even under normal circumstances at the 
time jury selection occurs. 
 
137 See, e.g., Gray v. State, 562 A.2d 1278, 1284 (Md. 1989) (“[W]here there has been 
the passage of considerable time between the event and the attempt at reconstruction, there 
may be present an increased danger of perfectly innocent confabulation.”); United States v. 
Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 679 (2d Cir. 1990). 
138 Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
139 545 U.S. 231, 267–68 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 
106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting the potential effects of unconscious racism and stating 
that “[e]ven if all parties approach the Court’s mandate with the best of conscious intentions, 
that mandate requires them to confront and overcome their own racism on all levels—a 
challenge I doubt all of them can meet”). 
140 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 267–68 (citing literature); see also Bennett, supra note 15, at 
151–58 (surveying literature on implicit bias); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, 
Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of 
Peremptory Use Under the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 
(2007) (finding that a prospective juror’s race can influence peremptory challenge use and 
that self-reported justifications are unlikely to be useful in identifying that influence). 
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reliable.  It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a trial judge sustains a 
prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge in the first instance, but decides 
months or years later that the prosecutor was, in fact, not credible and that 
the defendant should therefore get a new trial. 
The Supreme Court noted the potential for unfairness under similar 
circumstances in Miller-El v. Dretke, where it rejected a prosecutor’s after-
the-fact reason for exercising a peremptory challenge that the prosecutor did 
not give during jury selection, stating that it “reek[ed] of afterthought,”141 
and noting that “when illegitimate grounds like race are in issue, a 
prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or 
fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives.”142
The same concerns apply with even greater force where the prosecutor 
may be asked to explain the challenge months or years later and the trial 
court is forced to make findings long after the fact.  The potential for post 
hoc rationalizations under such circumstances is great, particularly given 
that both the prosecutor and the trial court have a significant incentive to 
avoid a new trial.  As the Second Circuit put it,  
 
[p]ostponing consideration of a Batson claim until the trial is in progress, or even 
completed, . . . risks infecting what would have been the prosecutor’s spontaneous 
explanations with contrived rationalizations, and may create a subtle pressure for even 
the most conscientious district judge to accept explanations of borderline plausibility 
to avoid the only relief then available, a new trial.143
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER EVIDENTIARY PROCEEDINGS 
 
In some instances, trial courts have conducted evidentiary hearings on 
remand in an attempt to assist with the process of reconstructing memories 
of jury selection, but such hearings tend to exacerbate the burden on judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys without much countervailing benefit.  
Often they lead to new disputes, and in the absence of “smoking gun” type 
evidence of racial bias by the prosecutor, such proceedings seldom 
illuminate the original reasons for the prosecutor’s exercise of the 
peremptory challenge. 
Batson explicitly declined to set forth any procedural requirements 
beyond the general three-step inquiry in which a trial court assesses the 
credibility of a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory 
 
141 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246. 
142 Id. at 252. 
143 United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 679 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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challenge.144  Where a court of appeals orders a limited remand under 
Batson, the issue of the peremptory challenge is in sharp focus, and months 
or years have typically passed.  The defense and the prosecution predictably 
dispute what procedures should be followed on remand, such as whether the 
prosecutor who exercised the challenge should be required to testify under 
oath and subjected to cross-examination, whether the prosecutor will be 
permitted to offer additional reasons on remand beyond those given at jury 
selection, and whether the parties will be allowed to take discovery and 
submit new evidence.145
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s statements in Miller-El v. 
Dretke,
 
146 some courts have allowed prosecutors to supplement their race-
neutral explanations on remand.  In United States v. Taylor, for example, 
the Seventh Circuit ordered remands to the district court twice to supply 
missing Batson findings.  In the first remand, the trial court failed to supply 
the missing findings.  Accordingly, in conjunction with ordering the second 
remand, the Seventh Circuit suggested that the trial court conduct an 
evidentiary hearing.  On remand, the district court did so, and permitted the 
Government “to state reasons beyond [the] record for challenging or not 
challenging jurors in question.”147
Moreover, the danger of post hoc rationalization on remand is perhaps 
even greater when there is an evidentiary hearing than when the trial court 
simply tries to make retroactive findings without taking additional 
evidence.  Under such circumstances, the court is essentially inviting the 
prosecution to come up with new evidence that was not presented during 
the original trial, and potentially new theories, justifying the prior exercise 
 
 
144 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 (“We decline, however, to formulate particular procedures to 
be followed upon a defendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s challenges.”).  See 
generally Brett M. Kavanaugh, Note, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural 
Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99 YALE L.J. 187 (1989), for a discussion of the 
questions raised by the Court’s decision in Batson to decline to establish specific procedures 
for conducting the inquiry into a prosecutor’s motives. 
145 A recent petition for certiorari asked the Supreme Court to address such questions and 
to require that the defendant be given an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecutor under 
oath and have access to the prosecutor’s notes in connection with a Batson remand.  See 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Drake v. Louisiana, No. 09-998 (Feb. 18, 2010), available at 
2010 WL 638483.  The Court denied the petition.  130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010). 
146 See supra Part IV.B. 
147 Minute Order, United States v. Taylor, No. 01-CR-73 (N.D. Ind. July 8, 2008) 
(Docket Entry No. 1032).  The case is now pending before the Seventh Circuit in a third 
appeal, docketed as appeal No. 09-1291. 
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of a peremptory challenge.148
D. ENDLESS APPEALS AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS 
  And of course, the court is also inviting the 
defense to find and present further evidence that the prosecutor is prone to 
racial bias.  In sum, conducting an evidentiary hearing on remand is as 
likely to lead to new disputes as it is to supply the basis for missing 
findings. 
As is apparent from the forgoing discussion, Batson remand 
proceedings often involve the expenditure of significant judicial resources.  
At the same time, given the sensitive and subtle nature of the Batson 
inquiry, the passage of time, the fallibility of human memory, and the 
subconscious nature of racial bias, such proceedings often fail to produce 
conclusions worthy of confidence.  Thus, it is questionable whether on 
balance they further Batson’s purpose of “produc[ing] actual answers to 
suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury 
selection process.”149
In addition to being unreliable, such remand proceedings can often 




In 2004, during jury selection, the district court failed to make findings 
at the third step of the Batson procedure.
  One example of this phenomenon is the ongoing litigation in 
United States v. Taylor.  In Taylor, the indictment issued in 2001, and jury 
selection and the jury’s guilty verdict occurred in 2004.  The case is now, in 
2010, on its third appeal to the Seventh Circuit relating to the same Batson 
issues. 
151  In 2007, on the first appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit ordered a remand “for the limited purpose of 
supplementing the record with [the district court’s] findings about whether 
the government’s stated reason for exercising a peremptory challenge 
against [the stricken juror] is credible, or whether the defendants met their 
burden of demonstrating discrimination.”152
 
148 Cf. Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).  Cross-
examination of the prosecutor on remand showed that, after the remand, the prosecutor spent 
“six to eight hours” reviewing the transcript of jury selection and “that is when he came up 
with his explanations” for the challenged strikes.  Id. 
  On remand, the district judge 
149 Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005). 
150 This risk is particularly acute in cases involving relatively minor crimes with 
relatively uncomplicated facts.  For example, in United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657 (7th 
Cir. 2009), the defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm that had 
traveled in interstate commerce.  The initial trial and jury selection lasted one day, and a new 
trial would likely have consumed the same amount of time. 
151 United States v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839, 844–45 (7th Cir. 2007). 
152 Id. at 845–46. 
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reviewed transcripts and issued a short statement to the effect that he 
remembered jury selection (which had occurred nearly four years earlier) 
and concluded, based on his recollection of the prosecutor’s demeanor and 
arguments, that the prosecutor was credible.153
On a second appeal, in 2008, the Seventh Circuit found the district 
court’s findings still lacking and remanded again, ordering an evidentiary 
hearing so that the district court could “determine de novo whether the 
Batson challenge has merit.”
 
154  On the second remand, the parties engaged 
in a lengthy dispute regarding the appropriate procedures.  The district court 
allowed the prosecution to give new race-neutral explanations for its 
peremptory challenges, but it did not allow the defendants to cross-examine 
the prosecutors under oath or to have access to the prosecutors’ 
contemporaneous notes of jury selection.  After the evidentiary hearing, 
which was held more than four years after jury selection, the district court 
issued a twenty-one page opinion sustaining the peremptory challenge.155  
The case is on appeal to the Seventh Circuit for a third time, and among the 
defendants’ arguments are challenges to the procedures used during the 
evidentiary hearing.156
As long as the law remains unclear regarding the consequences of a 
trial court’s failure to make findings at the third step of the Batson 
procedure, such remands directed to reconstructing a procedure Justice 
Breyer described as “awkward” and “hopeless” will continue to tie up 
judicial resources, with little or no countervailing benefit. 
  Had the Seventh Circuit simply ordered a new trial 
instead of a remand, it seems likely that fewer resources would have been 
expended. 
E. EX ANTE INCENTIVES FOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND 
PROSECUTORS 
Finally, a bright-line rule requiring a new trial in every case in which a 
trial court fails to make sufficient Batson findings to permit appellate 
review would provide an ex ante incentive to trial judges and prosecutors to 
be more conscientious and would give effect to the principle underlying 
Batson.  From an ex post perspective, when a trial court has not made the 
required findings, the appellate court is presented with a choice between 
 
153 Statement, United States v. Taylor, No. 01-CR-73 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2008) (Docket 
Entry No. 1026). 
154 United States v. Taylor, 277 F. App’x 610,  613 (7th Cir. 2008). 
155 United States v. Taylor, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (N.D. Ind. 2009). 
156 Defendants-Appellants’ Joint Brief, United States v. Taylor, No. 09-1291 (7th Cir. 
filed June 16, 2009).  The Court heard oral argument on April 27, 2010, and the case remains 
pending.  Oral Argument, United States v. Taylor, No. 09-1291 (7th Cir. Apr. 27, 2010). 
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ordering a new trial and ordering a remand to see if the result of the initial 
trial can be salvaged, and the latter choice has an understandable appeal.  
But from an ex ante perspective, if trial judges know that insufficient 
Batson findings will lead to reversal on appeal and an automatic new trial, 
they will have an incentive to be more conscientious in discharging the task 
that Batson requires.  Similarly, prosecutors will have a clearer incentive to 
ensure that an appropriate contemporaneous record is made whenever a 
defendant raises a Batson challenge during jury selection.  A bright-line 
rule would thus provide a strong incentive to avoid the precise conduct that 
Batson was designed to remedy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Supreme Court should 
clarify its holding in Snyder and should—we suggest—adopt a clear rule 
that a new trial is required where the trial court fails to make the findings 
necessary to support the denial of a defendant’s Batson challenge and where 
the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation cannot be confirmed or rejected 
on the basis of the record. 
Such a rule will give trial courts a strong incentive to fulfill their 
“pivotal role” of supervising jury selection closely in the first instance.  
While the remedy of a new trial might be criticized as wasting the results of 
what may have been completely fair trials, it is fully consistent with Batson 
and in many instances it is the only practical way to give effect to the 
principle Batson announced, without discarding peremptory challenges.  In 
Batson, the Court rejected the reasoning of Swain and held that even though 
peremptory challenges are traditionally immune from judicial scrutiny, trial 
courts should nonetheless be able to examine a prosecutor’s reasons for 
exercising a peremptory challenge whenever there is a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Batson that what the trial court was 
looking for would often be a subtle, subconscious bias on the part of the 
prosecutor rather than overt racism.  Where a trial court fails to discharge 
that responsibility in the first instance in a way that permits appellate 
review, it is often neither feasible nor efficient to ask the trial court to do so 
retroactively.  A bright-line rule requiring a new trial is the most effective 
and efficient means of enforcing the Batson rule, and would bring needed 
clarity to the Supreme Court’s precedents. 
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